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1.CryptoFed 如何知道经济中所需的 Ducat 货币供应量？

在任何时候，杜卡特经济都需要一个最佳货币供应量。CryptoFed 使用加密货币市场上杜卡特和美元之间的外汇汇率来确定最佳货币供应量，即零通货膨胀（杜卡特不供过于求）和零通货紧缩（杜卡特不供不应求）。目标汇率是理论上的理想值。请参阅 杜卡特与美元的关系和 杜卡特通货膨胀和通货紧缩的衡量部分。偏离目标汇率将表明杜卡特供过于求或供不应求，可在杜卡特钱包应用程序上实时查看。

2.CryptoFed 创新了哪些政策工具来调整 Ducat 货币供应量，以保持可持续性？

CryptoFed has three innovative tools to adjust Ducat supply: Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy and Open Market Operations.

CryptoFed’s Fiscal Policy is defined as rewards paid in Ducat to consumers within at range of 5.5% -10% and merchants within a range of 1% - 4% for every purchase at participating merchants. The rewards are the primary methodology of CryptoFed’s Ducat money supply merchanism. CryptoFed’s Fiscal Policy is the equivalent of government spending controlled by the US Congress, not by the Federal Reserve. Given that both merchants and consumers, acting in their own self-interest, have incentives to actively use Ducat rather than USD, the absolute amount of Ducat tokens in the hands of households and businesses (stock amount) will be far less than what is potentially needed by the Ducat economy, although the instantaneous increase of Ducat per day or per month or per quarter may generate inflation measured by the Ducat price against USD on crypto exchanges. A rough gauge of the the total stock amount of Ducat needed may be estimated by possible Ducat market share (such as 30%) of the total currency markets measured by the sum of M3 of major currencies. The sum of M3 of the top five (5) currency zones was 55 trillion worth of USD as of November 2023. (see Monetary Aggregates and Their Components: Broad Money and Components: M3 for United States, M3 for Euro Area (19 Countries), M3 for Japan, M3 for Canada, M3 for United Kingdom). Therefore, it may take a few decades for the Ducat economy to have the need to reduce the lower bound of the rewards to consumers (5.5%) and merchants (1%). When and only when, for four (4) consecutive quarters, Ducat inflation cannot be cured by the combination of fiscal policy (reward rate 5.5% to consumers and 1% to merchants) and monetary policy (5% interest rate), will the lower bound of the reward rate to consumers (5.5%) and to merchants (1%) be lowered 20% quarterly until the inflation is cured.

CryptoFed’s Monetary Policy is defined as interest paid by CryptoFed to all Ducat holders. CryptoFed’s interest rate is the equivalent of the Federal Reserve’s interest rate on reserve balances. The difference is that CryptoFed pays interest to Ducat holders consisting of ordinary households and businesses, while the Federal Reserve pays the interest only to those banks which have accounts with the Federal Reserve. CryptoFed can increase its interest rate as high as necessary to deter or cure inflation. Interest rate increase has been proven to be an effective tool to control inflation. “Twenty-five years ago, on October 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve adopted new policy procedures that led to skyrocketing interest rates and two back-to-back recessions but that also broke the back of inflation and ushered in the environment of low inflation and general economic stability the United States has enjoyed for nearly two decades.” — FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER, Number 2004-35, December 3, 2004. Given that the Federal Reserve does not have control over the Congress’s fiscal policy, if the US Congress authorizes inflationary government spending, the Federal Reserve must skyrocket interest rates to control inflation, creating recessions more often than not. CryptoFed, by contrast, has both fiscal and monetary policies under one roof and can ensure the consistency between fiscal policy and monetary policy to avoid recession.

Open Market Operations is defined as buying and selling Ducat at crypto markets to maintain the Target Exchange Rate and keep the deviation within a 2% lower and upper bound. While Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy are adjusted on a quarterly basis to shift the fundamental economic conditions for those households (consumers) and businesses (merchants) who use Ducat for daily economic activities, Open Market Operations are conducted on a daily basis to shift temporary Ducat money supply.

Please see the sections of CONTROL OF DUCAT INFLATION AND DEFLATION and THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCKE AND DUCAT TOKENS on the home page.

3.为什么洛克令牌有价值？

在加密货币市场上，消费者用美元稳定币购买 Ducat，然后在商家处购买商品和服务，而商家用美元稳定币出售 Ducat，然后支付供应商、工资、店铺租金等运营成本。Ducat 的主要买家是消费者，而 Ducat 的主要卖家是商家。

Ducat 经济的扩张是由支付给商家的 3% 的费用驱动的，这些费用用于支付与以下交易相关的交易成本 加密货币支付网关(3%)，支付给消费者的奖励在 5.5% -10% 之间，支付给商家的奖励在 1% - 4% 之间。因此，商家可能会选择保留越来越多的杜卡特用于自身运营，在加密货币市场上出售的杜卡特越来越少，而越来越多的消费者将继续购买杜卡特。

因此，CryptoFed 必须出售杜卡特，以满足消费者对杜卡特的需求。收到的与美元挂钩的稳定币将全部用于从加密货币市场上买回洛克代币进行焚烧（销毁）。这种公开市场操作将提高洛克代币在加密货币市场上的价格。Ducat 经济越扩张，用于洛克代币回购的美元挂钩稳定币就越多，洛克代币的价格也就越高。洛克代币价格与Ducat经济扩张之间的良性循环机制旨在实现长期增长，这将使洛克代币和Ducat代币的持有者共同受益，从而使洛克代币有别于其他治理代币，如Uniswap的UNI和MakerDAO的MKR。

4.CryptoFed 设计了多少种方法来将新的杜卡特投入流通？

CryptoFed 将新的 Ducat 投入流通的方法只有六种：

i)Ducat 出售给在加密货币市场上用美元挂钩的稳定币购买 Ducat 的消费者。CryptoFed 收到的与美元挂钩的稳定币将仅用于从加密货币市场回购洛克代币进行焚烧（销毁）。

ii)Ducat 将作为利息支付给其持有者。

iii)当消费者在商家处以 Ducat 消费时，Ducat 将支付给消费者（5.5% - 10%）和商家（1% - 4%）。

iv)Ducat 支付给商家，以避免商家因 Ducat 兑换成美元而遭受外汇损失。

v)CryptoFed 直接向参与商户支付 Ducat（每笔交易 3%），以便商户可以选择自己的加密货币支付处理商，实现零交易成本，即使CryptoFed 将永远不会 "以任何形式收取任何交易费用"（CryptoFed 章程，第 1 条。使命）。

vi)Ducat 作为注册奖金支付给消费者。

CryptoFed 通过上述方法支付的所有 Ducat 金额将构成新的货币供应量，对特定时期的通货膨胀或通货紧缩产生影响。

5.CryptoFed 的货币供应机制与美联储的有何不同？

美联储是一个由 私人发行的基于债务的货币而 CryptoFed 是一个由 私人发行的无债务货币.

美联储 私人发行的债务型货币是由商业银行的借贷活动创造的，美联储通过这些活动将新的货币供给投入流通。"私人货币包括'商业银行货币'--商业银行账户中以美元计价的余额......目前美国至少有 19.4 万亿美元的私人货币"。(p.3, 美国财政部报告).美联储的货币供应机制要求在银行资产负债表上同时创造私人债务。货币供应取决于私人商业银行的借贷活动，但美联储无法直接控制商业银行的借贷活动。美联储能做的是通过联邦公开市场委员会决定的联邦基金利率来引导商业银行的借贷活动。 联邦公开市场委员会并由 纽约联邦储备银行. 因此，美联储的部分准备金银行体系合法地将美元经济中固有的、不可避免的宏观经济风险制度化，周期性地造成繁荣和萧条的商业周期（经济扩张和收缩），随后由联邦存款保险公司和纳税人进行大规模救助。 美国联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）和纳税人的钱通过政府干预进行大规模救助。. 此外，当债务积累的绝对水平过大而无法偿还时，美联储的货币供应机制就会停止良好运转。现有的还贷负担最终会达到这样一个水平：即使利率接近于零，借款人也无法满足贷款人偿还额外贷款的标准。因此，无法向私营部门提供足够的资金来维持和增加经济增长的有效需求。

私人发行的无债务货币是由六种CryptoFed 通过六种方法将新的 Ducat 货币投入流通（见常见问题 4）。CryptoFed 的货币供应机制是将 Ducat 货币直接分配给消费者（家庭）和企业（商家）。理查德-尼克松总统结束美元与黄金的可兑换性后，美元成为了法定货币："法定货币是不可赎回的，因为货币持有者不能要求用货币以外的东西来偿还"。(P.6, 重温芝加哥计划国际货币基金组织工作文件第 6 页）。同样，杜卡特持有者也不能要求用杜卡特以外的东西偿还。因此，从理论上讲，杜卡特可以是一种 私人发行的无债务货币根据一套直接分配规则，经参与者之间相互同意（《加密货币联盟章程》）。加密货币联邦宪法).由于杜卡特货币供应机制与从事杜卡特借贷的实体相分离，杜卡特货币供应功能不会受到从事杜卡特借贷实体倒闭的影响，从而消除了杜卡特经济中保险和救助的必要性。

6.CryptoFed 将使用哪些区块链协议？

CryptoFed 将使用以太坊协议和 EOS 协议来创建 Locke 和 Ducat 代币。使用以太坊协议的Locke和Ducat代币可以利用以太坊在全球范围内被广泛接受的优势进行买卖和交易。EOS协议中的Locke和Ducat代币可以利用EOS协议的交易速度、可扩展性和灵活性。"要利用区块链构建一个具有高扩展性、低延迟和零交易费的企业级金融产品，EOS是我们的选择"。文章"为什么我们要在 EOS 而不是以太坊上建立区块链业务？"一文提供了很好的证明。此外，EOS 是一个开源协议，使 CryptoFed 能够构建自己的 CryptoFed 区块链（姊妹链）。在两个不同的区块链协议上桥接 Locke 和 Ducat 代币是一个挑战，但用于 跨链桥接工具将可用。

7.CryptoFed 的部署路线图是什么？

在确保其业务模式符合联邦和各州的法律法规后（请参阅页面顶部的 "监管合规 "选项卡），CryptoFed 将遵循以下粗略的部署路线图：

i) 2024 年第四季度 - 2027 年第一季度
a) 洛克代币的首次发行：CryptoFed 计划向贡献者免费分发大量以太坊 ERC-20 形式的洛克代币。CryptoFed 将邀请 商户顾问团(MAG）的商户成员以及这些商户的员工成为CryptoFed的贡献者，免费接受洛克代币。由于监管限制，这些贡献者必须是怀俄明州居民或怀俄明州法人实体。

b) 洛克代币二级市场的形成：捐献者可以自行决定并为了自己的利益，选择在全国或全球范围内的集中式或分散式加密货币掉期或交易所出售洛克代币。这一活动的自然结果是洛克代币二级市场的独立形成。

ii) 2027 年第二季度起
(a) 怀俄明州的 Ducat 试点：如果洛克代币的价格至少连续一个月保持在每枚 0.10 美元以上，在确认符合监管规定后，CryptoFed 将与商家讨论，准备在拉莱米或夏延或两者进行接受 Ducat 支付的试点。

(b) 全国扩张：在确认怀俄明州 Ducat 试点成功并符合监管要求后，CryptoFed 将考虑在全国范围内推广 Ducat。

(c) 国际扩张：在确认美国至少五（5）个州的试点成功且符合监管要求后，CryptoFed 将考虑 Ducat 的国际扩张。

8.CryptoFed（Locke/Ducat）和 Terra Protocol（Luna/UST）之间有什么区别？

Like CryptoFed, Terra Protocol was also a 2-token economy. Terra collapsed within three days in May 2022, wiping out the entire valuation of UST and LUNA of $50 billion in total. LUNA was the native cryptocurrency of Terra Protocol with unlimited issuance. UST was the stablecoin of Terra Protocol pegged against the US Dollar. Because UST was backed by LUNA, swapping LUNA for UST was the only way to create new UST. Anchor was a borrowing and savings protocol developed by Terra. The holders of UST could deposit their UST at Anchor at a stable 19.5% yield until April 2022, one month prior to the collapse of Terra, when the Federal Funds Effective Rate was still less than 1%. For analysis of Terra’s failure and its impact, see Anatomy of a Run: The Terra Luna Crash and Interconnected DeFi: Ripple Effects from the Terra Collapse.

There are two major differences between CryptoFed (Locke/Ducat) and Terra Protocol (Luna/UST).

The first difference is that new Ducat is primarily created by rewards paid to both consumers and merchants upon the purchasing of goods and services, while new UST was created by swapping LUNA to UST. The money creation mechanism guarantees that Ducat can be used to directly purchase goods and services at merchants without conversion to US dollar, while UST does not have this guarantee. During financial crises, Ducat will be more stable than UST because Ducat can purchase goods and services, while UST could not.

The second difference is that Ducat is a floating exchange rate against USD, while UST was a fixed exchange rate. “As easily demonstrated in a Mundell-Fleming framework, it is generally not possible for a country to simultaneously enjoy (1) a fixed (or managed) exchange rate, (2) an independent monetary policy, and (3) free international capital mobility.” (Nobel Laureate 2022 and the Fed’s Chair 02/1/2006 – 01/31/2014, Ben S. Bernanke, 2015, p. 11, Federal Reserve Policy in an International Context, Brookings Institution). However, Terra Protocol (Luna/UST) completely ignored the Mundell-Fleming framework. UST tried to simultaneously enjoy (1) a fixed exchange rate against USD which was 1UST = 1USD, (2) an independent monetary policy which was 19.5%%, significantly higher than 1% of the Federal Funds Rate for USD, and (3) free international capital mobility which meant that UST could be sold or bought without any restrictions.

Because UST had to maintain 1:1 fixed exchange rate between UST and USD, money could convert (flee) from UST to USD without suffering foreign exchange loss (in contrast to floating exchange rate). The bank run against UST could not be stopped once it started, leading to the death spiral of UST, because there was no self-stabilization mechanism to bring UST back to its previous peg, given that LUNA’s value also decreased rapidly during the crisis and could not provide sufficient support for UST.

To maintain an equilibrium under a fixed exchange rate between US dollar economic zone and a USD-pegged stablecoin economic zone, without restricting the capital mobility (free conversion between UST and USD) between the two economic zones, Mundell-Fleming framework dictates that the USD-pegged stablecoin must have the similar or identical monetary policy as the US dollar (around 1% for USD, not an independent 19.5% yield for UST). As a result, to maintain a stable peg, a USD-pegged stablecoin economic zone must be a subset of the US dollar economic zone and cannot be an independent economic zone. In other words, a USD-pegged stablecoin economic zone is similar to a private commercial bank serving its customers under the Federal Reserve’s federal funds rate. Furthermore, a USD-pegged stablecoin economic zone must maintain 100% backup with US dollar or short-term US Treasury Bill (not backup by LUNA whose value could decrease rapidly during the crisis), otherwise it will be subject to fractional banking with the inherent risk of a bank run.

Historically, fixed exchange rate (currency peg) regime without 100% reserve of the pegged currencies or assets tended to fail. Below are two examples:

[1] The peg between the US dollar and gold was broken by economic dynamics. Fifty years ago, the world changed. On August 15, 1971, US President Richard Nixon slammed shut the “gold window,” suspending dollar convertibility. Although it was not Nixon’s intention, this act effectively marked the end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. — IMF Blog, From the History Books: The Rethinking of the International Monetary System.

‍[2] The peg between the British pound and ERM was broken by economic dynamics. In the summer of 1992, hedge fund manager George Soros was contemplating the possibility that the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) would break down. Designed to pave the way for a full-scale European Monetary Union, the ERM was a system of fixed exchange rates linking together twelve members of the European Union, including Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. — Who Broke the Bank of England?

In contrast to Terra Protocol (Luna/UST), by learning lessons from history and following the guidance of Mundell-Fleming framework, CryptoFed has designed a floating exchange rate between Ducat and USD, instead of a fixed exchange rate. Floating exchange rate enables CryptoFed to enjoy freedom of its own monetary policy (interest rate) and fiscal policy (rewards to consumers and merchants) to manage its own money supply and control inflation and deflation, without restricting the capital mobility (conversion) between Ducat and USD. Ducat economic zone is independent of US dollar economic zone, because Ducat has a floating exchange rate against US dollar which plays a role of a wall separating the two economic zones.

In order to ensure that merchants accepting Ducat will maintain the same price for goods and services in Ducat during crises, CryptoFed will make up the difference in Ducat between the Target Exchange Rate and actual exchange rate automatically via smart contract for merchants suffering foreign exchange loss. As a result, merchants will be protected from foreign exchange loss, while consumers will be subject to foreign exchange rate loss for conversion from Ducat to USD. Please see the section of SHIELD FOR MERCHANTS’ FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOSS on the home page.

During crises, the Ducat price against US dollar may fall sharply to a level far below the Target Exchange Rate. As long as consumers can purchase goods and services at merchants at the same price in Ducat, despite the sharp Ducat devaluation, consumers will buy more Ducat rather than fleeing from Ducat, because fleeing from Ducat means foreign exchange loss, and buying more Ducat for purchasing goods and services of daily life means foreign exchange gain. During a sharp Ducat devaluation, the larger the difference between the Target Exchange Rate and actual exchange rate becomes, the larger Ducat amount consumers will buy to enjoy the Ducat discount. As a result, the Ducat price against US dollar will be supported by consumers and will recover through their actions driven by their own interest (market force), given that CryptoFed will simultaneously adjust fiscal and monetary policies to cure the inflation during the crisis. This self-sustainability of Ducat does not rely on Ducat buyback with Locke and is completely independent of the value of Locke. Please see the section of THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCKE AND DUCAT TOKENS on the home page.

“…I think the key element, breakthrough, that I thought for myself that I was making was in the seeing the economy as determined by a combination of two basic macro economic conditions. One is equilibrium in the goods and services market, and equilibrium in the foreign exchange market.”, said Professor Robert A. Mundell at his December 1999 Nobel Prize Reward interview. By design, in CryptoFed economy, the goods and services market and the foreign exchange market are consistently and cohesively integrated by the Ducat creation mechanism and a floating exchange rate between Ducat and USD. Conversely, Terra economy has neither goods and services market to absorb UST nor a foreign exchange market (no floating exchange rate) to isolate UST from rapidly draining, while still trying to have its own monetary policy of 20% interest rate under a fixed exchange rate 1UST = 1USD. “But was it sustainable? Obviously a 20% yield on more than $10B of UST — more than $2B a year in interest payments — could not be given out using interest paid by borrowers alone.”

9.Ducat 如何与信用卡、央行数字货币（CBDC）和与美元挂钩的稳定币竞争？

CryptoFed 将向商家支付与以下方面相关的交易费用 加密货币支付网关(3%），当消费者在商家购物时，向消费者（5.5% - 10%）和商家（1% - 4%）提供奖励，同时保持 CryptoFed 交易成本为零。Ducat 将实现零通胀和更高的 实际利率高于美元。信用卡、与美元挂钩的 稳定币和 CBDC都无法为消费者和商家提供这些好处。因此，消费者和商家将有很大的动力使用 Ducat 作为支付手段和价值储存手段。此外，Ducat 和与美元挂钩的稳定币是互补的，因为美元稳定币将成为 Ducat 经济和美元经济之间的过渡桥梁。

10.为什么 BTC、ETH、Doge、Sol 和 XRP 等现有加密货币做不到 CryptoFed 要做的事情？

与黄金一样，这些现有加密货币（货币供应）的存在和生产是一个完全独立于消费者和商家经济活动的外生过程。从消费者和商家经济活动产生的需求来看，这些现有加密货币的创造和存量可能会导致通货膨胀（供过于求）或通货紧缩（供不应求）。此外，这些现有加密货币的供不应求或供过于求无法根据源自消费者和商家经济活动的需求按比例进行调整，这就导致了一个必然的结论，即以个人消费支出价格指数的年度变化来衡量，这些现有加密货币既不会出现通货膨胀，也不会出现通货紧缩。 个人消费支出价格指数（PCE(PCE）的年度变化来衡量，这些现有加密货币的通货膨胀和通货紧缩都是不可治愈的。换句话说，这些加密货币相对于商品和服务的定价波动是固有的，无法治愈。与这些现有的加密货币相比，杜卡特的创造（货币供应）机制在设计上不仅是一个基于消费者和商家经济活动的内生过程，而且还包括调整货币供应的政策工具，以保持相对于商品和服务的价格稳定，例如杜卡特经济中的零通货膨胀和通货紧缩。请参阅 新货币的必要性 部分。